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Lessons from the French Experiment
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In October 2007 France introduced an exemption on the income tax and social security 
contributions that applied to wages received for hours worked overtime. The goal of the 
policy was to increase the number of hours worked. This article shows that this reform has 
had no significant impact on hours worked. Conversely, it has had a positive impact on the 
overtime hours declared by highly qualified wage-earners, who have opportunities to 
manipulate the overtime hours they declare in order to optimize their tax situation, since the 
hours they work are difficult to verify. 
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affiliated. 1 Introduction
In France, since 1 October 2007, remuneration paid for hours worked overtime has been exempt
from income tax and a substantial portion of social security contributions. This detaxation
was an essential plank of the economic policy introduced after the presidential elections of May
2007. For France￿ s new president, detaxation of overtime hours o⁄ered numerous advantages.
In valorizing work, it sounded the death knell of the Malthusian culture symbolized by the 35-
hour work week, the impact of which on employment was open to legitimate doubt.1 It did not
directly challenge the 35-hour legal work week, to which many French people remain attached.
In short, the tax exemption on overtime hours looked like the ideal instrument for injecting
dyamism into the French economy by giving an incentive to "work more to earn more."
In recent years, other countries have adopted similar reforms. Since 1996 Austria exempts
the extra rate paid for overtime from income tax, with a maximum of 10 hours per month. In
Belgium taxes and social security contributions on the extra overtime rate have been reduced
since 2005.2 Italy introduced a similar measure in 2008, but suspended it at the close of that
year in the face of rising unemployment. Finally, Luxembourg has had in place exemptions from
tax and social security payments for hours of paid work beyond the legal limit since the start of
2008.3 While none of these countries has undertaken a reform as far-reaching as that of France,
the view that detaxation of overtime hours is an e⁄ective means of increasing the number of
hours worked appears to have convinced a signi￿cant number of policymakers in Europe.
Economic analysis puts the matter in a di⁄erent perspective: it stresses the fact that if
taxation is to be e¢ cient, it must de￿ne a tax base that the authorities can easily verify.4 Now
in most cases, it is hard for a third party to verify the number of hours worked when employers
and employees have a shared interest in not revealing it. And that is indeed the case with the
1Patrick Artus, Pierre Cahuc and AndrØ Zylberberg (2007), Matthieu Chemin and Etienne Wasmer (2009).
2In Belgium there has been a reduction of ￿scal costs on the ￿rst 65 overtime hours per calendar year since
1 July 2005. This ceiling was raised to the ￿rst 100 hours for the year 2009, and since 1 January 2010 it is set
at 130 hours. The advantage for the employee consists of a tax reduction, and for the employer in reduced social
contributions on the extra rate for overtime hours. Hence an important di⁄erence between the French and Belgian
mechanisms is that the compulsory rate of tax deduction on overtime hours is at least as high as that on normal
hours in Belgium, since the tax exemption applies only to the extra overtime rate, whereas in France it is the
total remuneration for overtime hours, not just the extra rate, to which the exemption applies.
3In Luxembourg, from 1 January 2008 the base rate of remuneration for overtime hours (apart from the
extra) was no longer subject to income tax (except for the extra overtime rate). Since 1 January 2009 the entire
remuneration for overtime hours is exempt from tax, and an exemption for social security contributions has been
introduced, but only up to a limit of an overtime extra rate of 40%.
4Especially since the works of James Mirrlees (1971) and Agnar Sandmo (1981). For a recent overview of this
topic, see the article by Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Claus Thustrup Kreiner, and Emmanuel Saez (2009).
1tax exemption on overtime hours: employers and wage-earners have an interest in declaring
overtime hours in order to bene￿t from the tax cut. Hence it is far from obvious that detaxation
of overtime hours, costly in any case,5 leads directly to an increase in hours worked.6.
The graph in ￿gure 1 displays the evolution of the average weekly number of paid overtime
hours for the period 2003-2009.7 We see that paid overtime hours are more numerous after the
introduction of the reform in 2007 than before. The level of paid overtime hours rose in 2007
and has remained relatively high since, while the economy was entering a deep recession.8
The increase in paid overtime hours beginning in 2007 observed on graph 1 is not necessarily
linked to the reform.9 It might result from a more intensive utilization of overtime hours by ￿rms
that were avoiding hiring in anticipation of the onset of recession. Moreover, even if the increase
in overtime hours is indeed linked to the reform, it is possible that it did not entail a rise in hours
actually worked. This scenario is plausible to the extent that a signi￿cant percentage of overtime
hours worked is not explicitly remunerated.10 Prior to October 2007, employees whose labor
5The o¢ cial cost for 2008 is estimated at 4.4 billion euros, which represents around 40% of the total
budget of the French state for employment. http://www.vie-publique.fr/actualite/alaune/loi-faveur-heures-
supplementaires-quel-bilan.html
6The IMF report on France dated 19 November 2007 underlines this danger: ￿While the aim of reducing
workweek restrictions, providing enterprises with greater ￿ exibility and lowering marginal wage costs, is laudable,
the exemption of taxation on overtime entails considerable windfall e⁄ects (e⁄ets d￿ aubaine), is operationally
complex in order to avoid likely fraud, and bene￿ts insiders. Given its cost in terms of lost revenue, its e⁄ect in
increasing working hours, which is subject to uncertainty, will have to be monitored carefully. The measure is
overall a second-best response to the original distortion of the mandatory workweek reduction. It is emblematic of
the pernicious nexus between rigid labor market institutions and the budget that, after having spent considerable
sums to implement the 35-hour workweek, additional public money is now being diverted to circumvent it.￿
https://www.imf.org/external/np/ms/2007/111907.htm.
7We utilize the ongoing EnquŒte Emploi (Labor Force Survey), which seeks information from persons through-
out the year, and which began in January 2003. Before that date, the EnquŒte Emploi was based on interrogations
which took place during the month of March every year. The data on overtime hours are not perfectly homogen-
eous over the span 2003-2009, since persons who had not changed jobs since the previous interrogation were only
asked about their hours exceeding the the maximum during the ￿rst two interrogations (each person is queried
once per trimester for 6 consecutive trimesters). Since the fourth trimester of 2006, questions about the number
of overtime hours are asked at every interrogation. We have systematically veri￿ed that our results, derived from
data covering the whole period 2003T1-2009T3, retain their validity for the sub-period 2006T4-2009T3.
8This increase in paid overtime hours might result from changed behavior in compiling tax declarations,
prompted by the introduction of detaxation. In fact, surveys carried out on ￿rms have revealed that a signi￿cant
percentage of ￿rms in which the work week habitually exceeded 35 hours did not declare overtime hours prior to
October 2007. This proportion may have shrunk after October 2007 (Chagny et al., 2010). The EnquŒte Emploi
does not allow us to detect a signi￿cant growth of overtime hours linked to this type of behavior. We can ascertain
it by studying the evolution of the declarations of paid overtime hours of persons who declare they work 39 hours
both before and after October 2007. On average, persons who work 39 hours declare 0.09 paid overtime hours per
week (with a standard deviation equal to .02) before October 2007 and 0.12 hours from October 2007 on (with
a standard deviation equal to 0.01). The p-value linked to the null hypothesis of an equality of overtime hours
before and after October 2007 is equal to 20%.
9Other statistical sources con￿rm this increase in paid overtime hours in 2007 (Chagny, Gonzales, and Zilber-
man, 2010).






















































































































































































Figure 1: Average number per quarter of paid overtime hours per full-time employee. Non-
agricultural for-pro￿t sector. Source: EnquŒte Emploi.
contract stipulated a weekly duration of 35 hours were working 37 hours on average and were
declaring only 0.4 paid overtime hours per week.11 If the regulations governing hours worked
had been rigorously respected, there ought to have been 2 paid hours per week.12 Moreover,
if the regulations had been followed to the letter, the correlation between the paid overtime
hours and the hours worked by employees whose labor contract stipulates a work week of 35
hours ought to be close to 1. Before October 2007, however, it came to 0.39.13 In substance,
paid overtime hours and length of time worked frequently vary independently, and it is not at
Carlos Mallo (2007) have estimated, for the United States, a model where employers and employees may have a
shared interest in not declaring overtime hours to the authorities because of the costs associated with entering
overtime hours in the accounts, and with the interpretation of the legal rules. The under-declaration of overtime
hours in Germany is documented by Thomas Bauer and Klaus Zimmerman (1999). David Bell and Robert Hart
(1999) highlight a signi￿cant volume of unpaid overtime hours in the United Kingdom.
11Here we take into consideration employees in the commercial non-agriculture sector whose labor contract
stipulates a work week of 35 hours and who do not declare overtime hours o⁄set by compensating rest time. The
period assessed is 2003T1-2007T3, in other words before the introduction of the reform.
12This does not necessarily mean that these hours are not paid. The monthly wage may include such hours as
a result of an agreement between employee and employer not stipulated in the labor contract. Such hours may
also be remunerated in the form of a performance bonus, despite such a bonus being forbidden and subject to
judicial sanction.
13Again, we consider employees in the commercial non-agriculture sector whose labor contract stipulates a work
week of 35 hours and who do not declare overtime hours o⁄set by compensating rest time. The period assessed
is 2003T1-2007T3, in other words before the introduction of the reform.
3all obvious that an increase in paid overtime hours has direct repercussions on the duration of
work.
In order to evaluate the impact of the detaxation, we compare the evolution of the paid
overtime hours and the hours worked of two groups of individuals, one of which is a⁄ected
by the reform and the other not. The treatment group is composed of employees who reside
and work in France. The untreated group is composed of employees who reside in France but
work abroad, in regions adjoining the French border. These transborder workers (travailleurs
frontaliers, literally "border workers") did not bene￿t from the detaxation of overtime hours.
Hence the overtime hours and hours worked of French employees who work in regions near
those of the transborder workers ought to rise relative to those of the transborder workers, from
the fourth quarter of 2007 on, if the reform really did have the e⁄ects anticipated and if other
events did not modify the relative hours of the two groups of employees. In order to ensure the
pertinence of the results obtained, we take into account the di⁄erences in economic situation
between countries, the evolution of regulatory frameworks on both sides of the borders, as well
as the di⁄erences between the two groups of employees studied.
Ultimately, we ￿nd that the overtime hours of employees working in France rose, relative
to those of the transborder employees, starting in the fourth quarter of 2007. This rise in
overtime hours applies solely to highly-quali￿ed employees, who have many ways to manipulate
the overtime hours they declare in order to achieve tax optimization, because the length of
time they work is particularly di¢ cult to check on. Conversely, we detect no di⁄erence in the
evolution of hours worked, whatever category of employee is considered. These results suggest
that the upshot of the detaxation of overtime hours has essentially been tax optimization, with
no real impact on the length of time worked. These results are con￿rmed by comparison of
the evolution of the duration of work by employees in very small ￿rms and that of independent
workers who have not been directly a⁄ected by the detaxation of overtime hours.
This article is organized as follows: Section 2 reviews the content of the regulations governing
length of time worked, and that of the reform of October 2007, which introduced detaxation of
overtime hours. Section 3 is devoted to a theoretical discussion of the consequences of detaxation
of overtime hours. We start by presenting a model which shows that detaxation of overtime hours
does increase the length of time worked if the hours are perfectly veri￿able, since the enhanced
remuneration of overtime hours induced by the detaxation incentivates employees to work more.
4This is the objective of the reform. Yet, when the hours are totally unveri￿able, detaxation
of overtime hours leads to a diminution of the length of time worked, for it is possible to
increase one￿ s income by declaring ￿ctive hours; this increase in income incentivates employees
to work fewer hours if leisure is a normal good, a generally accepted hypothesis. Thus, in
the intermediate case, pertinent from an empirical viewpoint, in which hours are imperfectly
veri￿able by the authorities, detaxation of overtime hours should have an ambiguous impact on
length of time worked. Section 4 describes the evolution of the declared overtime hours and the
hours worked of employees for the period 2003-2009, in order to highlight the speci￿city of this
evolution in October 2007. Section 5 compares the evolution of the overtime hours and length of
time worked of individuals a⁄ected, and ones not a⁄ected, by the detaxation of overtime hours.
Some concluding observations are o⁄ered in section 6.
2 The regulation of the duration of work, and the detaxation of
overtime hours
2.1 Regulation of the duration of work before October 2007
Since 1 January 2000, France has lived with the 35-hour regime imposed by the Aubry laws,14 as
opposed to 39 hours previously. But the regulations governing time spent at work go far beyond
the speci￿cation of the legal limit on work time. They comprise numerous mechanisms which
form a complex ensemble of constraints and limits on the length of time e⁄ectively worked. Two
of these are particularly important. They concern overtime hours, and the annual lump sum of
days.
By de￿nition, every hour of work performed beyond the legal limit of 35 hours per week
is an overtime hour. Until 1 October 2007, it entitled the worker to an increase in his or her
remuneration varying between minimums of 10% to 50% of the normal hourly wage, according to
the size of the ￿rm (10% minimum in ￿rms with at most 20 employees, 25% minimum beyond
that), the sectoral agreements in place (which might dictate more favorable rates), and the
number of hours e⁄ected (a minimum increase of 50% once past the threshold of 8 overtime
hours per week). But working time could also be reckoned on an annual rather than a weekly
basis. By agreements in place at the level of sector, ￿rm, or establishment, certain employees
fall under a "modulated" regime in which the duration of work may vary over all or part of the
14The date 1 January 2000 applied to ￿rms with 20 employees or more; for the others, the 35-hour rule was
imposed starting on 1 January 2002 (art. L.3121-10 of the labor code).
5year, but may not exceed 1607 hours. Within this framework, hours worked in excess of this
ceiling are considered overtime hours.
A range of mechanisms restricts the use of overtime hours. In the ￿rst place, the legislation
provides for maximum durations of work: 10 hours per day (8 hours for night work, and 12
hours maximum under a collective agreement), and 48 hours per week (without exceeding 44
hours on average over a period of 12 consecutive weeks). In essence, overtime hours are limited
by rules based on the idea that there will be more jobs if every employed person works fewer
hours. The principal mechanism is the annual quota, the volume of which is ￿xed at 220 hours
by decree, but which can be modi￿ed (downward only) by a collective sectoral agreement, and
also by an agreement at the ￿rm or establishment level under certain conditions. The employer
is required, in principle, to inform the inspector of labor, and to obtain his permission on a
case by case basis, to have overtime hours performed in excess of the quota. Overtime hours
also create an entitlement to a complex system of rest time which, in substance, provides for
extra holidays as a function of overtime hours e⁄ected: on one hand, if a sectoral agreement
provides for it, remuneration for overtime hours may be replaced by a compensatory rest period
of equivalent length (and in this case the overtime hours do not count toward the annual quota);
on the other, once the quota is exceeded, obligatory compensation is triggered in the form of a
rest period equalling 50% of the duration of the hours e⁄ected in ￿rms of 20 employees or less,
and 100% in ￿rms with more than 20 employees once the quota is exceeded (and 50% above the
threshold of 41 hours or more).
Faced with such constraints, many employers prefer to pay "premiums" or "bonuses," which
are often remuneration for undeclared overtime hours. Labor ministry investigations regularly
reveal that the quantity of overtime hours really being worked is unknown.
Besides, in 2007, certain employees were governed by the arrangement specifying an an-
nual lump sum of days. These were managers, or non-managerial employees who enjoyed real
autonomy in how they managed their time. In this case a collective agreement covering a sector,
a ￿rm, or an establishment determined the number of days worked. Absent such an agreement,
the upper limit of the lump sum is set by default at 218 days per year.
62.2 The detaxation of overtime hours introduced in October 2007
Thus, in essence, the regulation of working time in 2007 was characterized by a legal duration
of 35 hours per week, and by stringent limits on the utilization of overtime hours. The law "to
promote work, employment, and purchasing power" (travail, emploi, pouvoir d￿ achat, hence "the
TEPA law," or "the ￿scal package law") adopted on 1 August 2007 marked the ￿rst change in the
regulation of working time. The TEPA law abolishes none of the regulatory and administrative
mechanisms limiting the use of overtime hours. All it does is alter their cost, from 1 October
2007 on. In the ￿rst place, the TEPA law renders the rate of extra remuneration for overtime
hours uniform, setting it at 25% whatever the size of the ￿rm (absent extended sectoral collective
agreements, or ones at the ￿rm level, providing for a di⁄erent rate). This uniformization entailed
an increase in the cost of an overtime hour for many ￿rms with fewer than 21 employees, for
which the rate of extra pay for overtime had previously been 10%. To o⁄set this extra cost,
￿ at-rate reductions in the social security contributions paid by employers on overtime hours were
introduced: 1.5 euros per hour in ￿rms with at most 20 employees, 0.5 euros for the rest. Next,
the overtime hours performed by a private-sector or public-sector employee were exempted from
income tax and wage-based social security contributions (up to a limit of 21.5% of the gross
wage). The TEPA law was clearly intended to make the utilization of overtime hours attractive,
especially for employees.
3 The consequences of detaxation: some theoretical remarks
Prior to the TEPA law, the constraints that limited overtime hours led many employers to
reward overtime work with premiums. With the tax burden on overtime removed, they have
an interest in abandoning this practice and paying for overtime hours, since that is a way to
pay less tax. Detaxation of overtime hours may then lead to an increase in hours declared, with
no change in the length of time e⁄ectively worked. More generally, employers and employees in
principle have a shared interest in paying and receiving as much remuneration as possible in the
form of overtime hours, without necessarily increasing the length of time worked. Opportunities
to do so are many, since it is very hard for the ￿scal authorities to check on how much time
was really worked when employee and employer concert their declaration of an amount. This
is the Achilles￿heel of detaxation of overtime hours. Let us begin by reviewing several of these
opportunities, and then their implications for the impact of detaxation of overtime hours.
73.1 Tax optimization
To treat premiums￿ rewards for good results￿ as compensation for overtime hours is to skirt
legality. Top-performing employees may indeed be doing work at home, or thinking about
their tasks while in transit. Equally, it is possible to reckon time spent on breaks or in transit as
overtime hours. Besides, nothing prevents ￿rms from remunerating overtime hours by increasing
the rate of extra pay for overtime while reducing pay for normal hours. An individual may thus
have a monthly wage that remains unchanged, but of which a smaller portion is subject to tax.
The growth of such practices, extremely di¢ cult for the authorities to check on, may transform
detaxation of overtime hours into a veritable manna for ￿rms and employees.
The studies available suggest that this manna may be exploited assiduously. A number of
them show that employees and ￿rms rebalance the various components of overall remuneration
in response to the legal and ￿scal environment. In the United States, the Fair Labor Standards
Act (FLSA) passed in 1938, instituted a legal weekly duration of 40 hours, and raised the
rate of extra pay for overtime hours to 50% once past that legal threshold (a total rate of
remuneration called "time and a half" in the vernacular). But this law did not immediately
come into force everywhere. Retail commerce in particular was exempt from it for a long
time, whereas the wholesale trade felt the impact immediately. Since these two sectors have
similar characteristics, it is possible to bring out the consequences of the overtime increase by
comparing their performance during the period when the rate of increase was di⁄erent for each,
a task undertaken by Dora Costa (2000). She ￿nds that employers reacted to the introduction
of the FLSA by reducing the wage paid for normal hours, but without totally nullifying the
extra cost of overtime hours. In the southern states, where the clauses bearing on the minimum
wage were more stringent for employers than in the northern states, the average wage clearly
rose more in the wake of the FLSA than in the northern states, and the dip in hours worked was
greater. Dora Costa also ￿nds that the introduction of the FLSA had little e⁄ect on the overall
volume of employment.
A contribution by Stephen Trejo (2003) uses a closely-related methodology, exploiting the
di⁄erences in the application of the FLSA according to sector between 1970 and 1989. Over
that period, the number of employees covered by the FLSA, and who therefore had to be paid
50% more for each hour worked beyond the legal weekly duration of 40 hours, rose considerably
in 5 sectors, including transportation and retail commerce. Trejo￿ s statistical analysis ￿nds no
8signi￿cant e⁄ect, either on the percentage of workers putting in overtime hours, or on the overall
volume of overtime hours. He explains this result by the decrease in the wage for normal hours,
which o⁄set the increase in the cost of overtime hours.
The studies by Costa and Trejo clearly illustrate the fact that employers and employees
focus on the overall "package," in which the things that count are the sum total of hours
worked and the remuneration received. That is why increases in the rate of extra pay for
overtime hours are neutralized and have no e⁄ect when there is no minimum wage to prevent
the reduction of the hourly wage. That is also why employers and employees may alter the
various components of the labor contract so as to obtain ￿scal advantages: company-supplied
automobiles, restaurant cheques and other advantages in kind are forms of remuneration utilized
when they are advantageous in ￿scal terms. These advantages lead to lower wages, but they are
mutually bene￿cial, since they constitute a way to reduce the total tax take drawn from employer
and employee. Tax law restrains their use in order to limit abuse. Conversely, detaxation of
overtime hours opens up wide possibilities of tax optimization that are costly for the public
￿nances.
Now, the impact of detaxation of overtime hours on hours e⁄ectively worked depends in large
part on the veri￿ability of overtime hours, as we shall now show.
3.2 Detaxation of overtime hours and length of time worked
To show that the veri￿ability of hours worked does a⁄ect the impact of detaxation of overtime
hours on the length of time worked, we consider a labor market with workers of heterogen-
eous productivity. The productivity of a worker is measured by the parameter ￿ > 0 , the
distribution of which is not degenerated in a single point of mass. A worker of productivity
￿ produces a quantity ￿f(H); f(0) = 0; f0 > 0;f00 < 0; when he works for duration H: The
workers have identical preferences represented by a utility function U(C;L); quasi-concave and
strictly increasing in relation to its two arguments: consumption C and leisure L; equal to total
disposable time, L0; reduced by the duration worked (L = L0 ￿ H).
The detaxation of overtime hours introduced in France allows the payment of lower taxes
on overtime hours than on normal hours. This amounts to subsidizing overtime hours. In order
to lighten our presentation, we assume that the rate of taxation on normal hours is null, and
we denote by se the rate of the subsidy on overtime hours ￿ owing to employees, and by sf the
9rate of the subsidy on overtime hours ￿ owing to employers. We are therefore situated within a
framework of partial equilibrium, which leaves out the impact of how the subsidies on overtime
hours are ￿nanced. The legal rate of extra pay for overtime hours, paid by the employer to the
employee, is denoted p:
We consider a labor market where competing ￿rms o⁄er contracts stipulating an hourly wage
and a length of time to be worked. At labor market equilibrium, the contracts maximize the
utility of employees under the constraint of null pro￿t for ￿rms. The allocation thus obtained
is a Pareto optimum.
It will be helpful to take two diametrically opposed cases in turn: in the ￿rst, overtime hours
are perfectly veri￿able by the authorities, in the second totally unveri￿able. The second case
is the one habitually envisaged in the literature treating optimal taxation, in the wake of the
seminal contribution of Mirrlees (1971): the overall remuneration received by the employee is
assumed to be veri￿able, but the number of hours worked is not. In this framework, productivity
￿ is private information held by the ￿rm and the employee and cannot be veri￿ed by third parties.
3.2.1 Veri￿able hours worked
We assume that hours worked are veri￿able by the authorities. Denoting the legal duration of
work by ￿ H and the hourly wage by w, the labor cost has the expression
wH + (pw ￿ sf)max(H ￿ ￿ H;0):
Assuming for the sake of simplicity that their wage is the sole source of income for the workers,
consumption is equal to the total wage received by the employee, augmented by the subsidy on
overtime hours:
wH + (pw + se)max(H ￿ ￿ H;0):
For each type of worker ￿; the duration of work and the equilibrium wage maximize utility
under the null pro￿t constraint which is written
￿f(H) = wH + (pw ￿ sf)max(H ￿ ￿ H;0):
Using the last two relations, it is apparent that the consumption of an employee of productivity
￿ may be written:
￿f(H) + (se + sf)max(H ￿ ￿ H;0):
10In consequence, the equilibrium duration of work for workers of productivity ￿ maximises
U
￿
￿f(H) + (se + sf)max(H ￿ ￿ H;0);L0 ￿ H
￿
:
It is immediately clear that the consumption and the duration of work of each employee are
independent of the rate of extra pay for overtime hours. We are back to the results highlighted
by Costa (2000) and by Trejo (2003). Conversely, the remuneration and the length of time
worked are dependent on the subsidy for overtime hours.
The solution of the program of maximization of hours is well-known. When the duration
of work in the absence of subsidy is less than or equal to the legal duration, the subsidy may
incentivate employees to work more. When the length of time worked in the absence of subsidy
is greater than or equal to the legal duration, the subsidy has an ambiguous impact on the length
of time worked: it causes an income e⁄ect which may, in theory, dominate the substitution e⁄ect,
but in practice this income e⁄ect is weak to the extent that the volume of overtime hours is
itself generally weak in relation to total volume of hours worked. In consequence, it is likely that
the substitution e⁄ect dominates and that overall the subsidy has a positive impact on hours
worked.
Hence, when overtime hours are veri￿able, detaxation of overtime hours is likely to have a
positive impact on hours worked.
This result is obtained on the assumption of a perfectly ￿ exible wage￿ something that is not
always the case, especially in France, where more than 10% of wage-earners are paid at minimum
wage and where collective bargaining plays a large part, especially at the lower end of the wage
spectrum. In this framework, the presence of a wage ￿ oor may limit the impact of detaxation
of overtime hours on hours worked, if it leads to a reduction in the hourly wage declared to the
authorities. The authorities can know the hourly wage since, by hypothesis, they observe the
total remuneration of the employee (equal to ￿F(H) + sf max
￿
H ￿ ￿ H;0
￿





(1+p)H if H > H
￿F(H)
H otherwise
shows that an increase in the subsidies se or sf may indeed lead to a lowering of the hourly
wage. For example, the hourly wage falls with sf and se when sf ! 0 if the subsidy for overtime
hours increases the duration of work. The presence of the wage ￿ oor then imposes a limit on the
rise in the length of time worked that would ￿ ow from the detaxation of overtime hours if the
11hourly wage were perfectly ￿ exible. Thus, at minimum wage level, the impact of the detaxation
on the length of time worked may be very slight if the subsidy allocated to ￿rms is weak, as it
is in France.
3.2.2 Unveri￿able hours worked
We revert to the case where the hourly wage is perfectly ￿ exible, and we now assume that the
overall remuneration of the worker is veri￿able, but that the quantity of hours worked is not. To
maximize the subsidy they receive, employees and employers then have an interest in stating the
highest possible number of overtime hours compatible with the maximum authorized duration
of work, or with a ceiling duration, beyond which ￿ctive overtime hours could be detected by
the authorities. If we denote Hmax ￿ ￿ H this maximum duration, the null pro￿t condition entails
that the consumption of a wage-earner of type ￿ is equal to
￿f(H) + (se + sf)(Hmax ￿ ￿ H):
Consequently, the equilibrium duration of work for workers of productivity ￿ maximizes
U
￿
￿f(H) + (se + sf)(Hmax ￿ ￿ H);L0 ￿ H
￿
:
It is immediately apparent that an increase in the subsidy for overtime hours is equivalent
to an increase in non-wage income, the impact of which on the length of time worked is negative
if leisure is a normal good, which is generally the case.
Hence, when overtime hours are unveri￿able, detaxation of overtime hours has a negative
impact on hours worked.
This result, obtained when the hourly wage is perfectly ￿ exible, remains valid in the presence
of a ￿ oor under the hourly wage. Nonetheless, the presence of an hourly wage ￿ oor may impose
a supplementary limit on the length of time worked that can be declared to the authorities,
since they, knowing the total remuneration, can verify that the declared length of time worked
does indeed correspond to an hourly wage higher than the authorized ￿ oor.15 So the presence of
a wage ￿ oor limits the opportunities for tax optimization when hours worked are unveri￿able.
At the limit, for employees paid the minimum legal or conventional wage, there is no margin
15The overall remuneration without subsidy is equal to the productivity of labor; if the hours e⁄ectively worked
do not vary, but hours declared increase, the hourly wage declared￿ i.e. calculable by the authorities￿ must be
adjusted downward.
12for maneuver to reduce the hourly wage, and detaxation of overtime hours gives rise to no
optimization.
On the whole, these lines of reasoning show that the impact of the detaxation of overtime
hours on the e⁄ective length of time worked depends largely on the veri￿ability of time worked,
which varies with categories of workers, and also on the degree of wage rigidity, which generally
varies with wage level.
4 The evolution of the length of time worked and overtime hours
4.1 The data
We use the Labor Force Survey (EnquŒte Emploi) carried out by INSEE. Each quarter, around
70,000 persons (residing in 45,000 residences) are queried, which represents a sampling rate of
residences of around 1/600th. This survey is ongoing. Every person (older than 15) in each
residence selected is queried once per quarter for six consecutive quarters.
The EnquŒte Emploi is the sole coherent source currently available for analyzing the impact
of the detaxation of overtime hours. For one thing, it tracks the duration of time worked
continuously since 2003. For another, the queries regarding the length of time worked are
very detailed.16 Overtime hours e⁄ected during the week preceding each interview are declared
at interview, and the distinction is made between those that are remunerated and those that
are compensated by rest days; total hours worked are also recorded, and information is supplied
about all kinds of holidays or absences that might have a⁄ected the volume; many characteristics
of the wage-earner (age, family situation, region, education, job held, type of labor contract,
payment of premiums, etc.) and of the ￿rm for which he or she works are also included in the
survey (especially the size of the ￿rm and the sector in which it is active).17
16They are presented in appendix A.
17Other administrative sources issuing from administrative declarations or surveys of heads of ￿rms include
information on overtime hours since the fouth trimester 2007. Examples include the annual declarations of
company data (DADS), or the recapitulatory statement of social security contributions (BRC) ￿lled out by ￿rms
monthly or trimestrially when social security contributions are paid. These two sources have been compiled
starting with the fourth trimester of 2007 in order to follow in detail the paid overtime hours (for the DADS) or
to deduct the reduction of social security contributions to which ￿rms and employs are entitled on overtime hours
starting on that date (for the BRC). But however reliable they may be, they contain no information on periods
prior to October 2007, and therefore cannot serve as a basis for the evaluation of the mechanism introduced by
the TEPA law.
As for surveys of ￿rms, such as the Acemo (ActivitØ et conditions d￿ emploi de la main d￿ oeuvre) and Ecmoss
(Coßt de la main d￿ oeuvre et la structure des salaires, available from 2005 on for overtime hours) they constitute the
instrument for tracking overtime hours until 2007. However, the information only covers ￿rms of 10 employees or
more (around 80% of the non-agriculture for pro￿t sector). Now, the recent measurements of overtime hours have
13We have selected individuals having a full time paid job in the non-agricultural for-pro￿t
sector, with a maximum work duration of 72 hours per week, whose work schedules have not been
interrupted by a strike, by time o⁄ for training, by illness, by a period of partial unemployment,
a business closure, or maternity.
We have eliminated employees who work under the lump-sum-of-days regime, as most man-
agers do. For this category, it is not so much the weekly duration of work that is sensitive to
detaxation as it is the total number of days worked during the year. We have likewise elim-
inated persons working under a modulation agreement, or one of annualized working time, for
whom the length of time worked may temporarily exceed the legal duration without triggering
overtime hours. Finally, we have excluded the unemployed and the retired (who may sometimes
have had some paid activity during the reference week of the survey), interns, and persons with
contracts supported in the context of some employment policy, as well as salaried executives,
seasonal workers, and those working for individual employers whose schedules fall under very
speci￿c constraints.
Paid overtime hours are on average e⁄ected by men to a greater extent than by women, by
employees under 50 more than by seniors, and more often among laborers and the intermediate
professions than among managers and white-collar employees (see appendix B). Among persons
who declare their wage level, it is especially in the vicinity of the median wage (equalling around
1.6 times the minimum wage) that the weekly averages of overtime hours are highest.
4.2 The rupture of October 2007
In order to detect the existence of an possible rupture in the evolution of the duration of work
and overtime hours in October 2007, we begin by analyzing the values of these variables before
and after that date for individuals working in France. This analysis enables us to show that paid
overtime hours increased signi￿cantly starting in October 2007, whereas the volume of hours
worked has remained unchanged.
Table 1 presents the evolution of the average of paid overtime hours, and hours worked, in
demonstrated that recourse to them evolves with the size of the ￿rm, which makes it di¢ cult to infer the behavior
of very small ￿rms. Moreover, these surveys tend to be a⁄ected by under-declaration, especially on the part of ￿rms
resorting to overtime hours with great regularity. Such ￿rms have had a strong incentive to declare their hours
when surveyed starting in October 2007, so as not to reveal any discrepancy with the statements of social security
contributions which permit them to bene￿t from detaxation. On these matters, see the Report to Parliament on
the putting into e⁄ect of article 1 of the law of 21 August 2007 to promote work, employment, and purchasing power
relative to the exemptions from charges on overtime hours (http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-
publics/094000050/index.shtml).
14October 2007 for persons queried before and after that date. The period covered thus runs from
July 2006 to December 2008 (persons are queried a maximum of 6 times, once each quarter).
The ￿rst column in table 1 reports the average weekly duration of work and the average
number of paid overtime hours before October 2007, for the ensemble of employees working
full-time. The second column presents the values of these two variables after October 2007.
The third column presents the di⁄erence between these two variables. Thus, the ￿rst line of
the third column shows that there is an increase of the order of 0.06 overtime hours per week.
The fourth column, which gives the p-value, shows that this increase is statistically signi￿cant
at the threshold of 1%. This is a substantial augmentation, inasmuch as the number of weekly
overtime hours was on average 0.40 hours per employee before October 2007. Paid overtime
hours thus increased by more than 10% starting in October 2007. Conversely, the second line of
the third column of table 1 indicates that the evolution of hours worked presents no rupture in
October 2007, for there is no statistically signi￿cant increase in hours worked. Thus, on average,
the whole population of employees declare signi￿cantly more overtime hours starting in October
2007, but do not work signi￿cantly longer durations starting on that date.18 This observation
is nevertheless very summary, concerning as it does the ensemble of employees.
Scrutiny of the evolution of the duration of work and overtime hours for di⁄erent categories
of employee makes it possible to re￿ne this observation. The third column of table 2 shows that
the overtime hours of managers, technicians, and the intellectual or artistic professions, and
of employees paid more than 1.3 times the minimum wage (called SMIC in France), increase
signi￿cantly, whereas those of laborers and employees remunerated at less than 1.3 times the
minimum wage do not increase. There is, moreover, no augmentation of the length of time
worked. These evolutions conform to the predictions of the theoretical model presented in the
previous section. Opportunities to declare ￿ctive hours are indeed more widely available when
the duration of work is harder to verify. And it is harder to check on the hours worked by
employees who enjoy greater autonomy in the scheduling of their work. This is generally the
situation of managers, technicians, and those employed in the intellectual and artistic professions.
Unlike managers, technicians, and the intellectual and artistic professions, laborers generally
have a more closely regulated duration of work, which a third party can more easily check up
on. Hence their opportunities for tax optimization are fewer. To sum up, table 2 shows that
18Appendix C shows that this phenomenon does not derive from a substitution between paid overtime hours
and overtime hours triggering the right to compensatory rest.
15paid overtime hours have increased signi￿cantly for the categories of employee whose duration
of work is di¢ cult to verify and whose wages are relatively ￿ exible, whereas it has not grown
signi￿cantly for laborers and low-wage workers whose duration of work is more easily veri￿able,
and whose wages are more often constrained by the legal minimum, and collective agreements.
In order to describe the evolution of overtime hours and the duration of work with greater
precision, it is helpful to distinguish between employees declaring overtime hours after October
2007 and those not declaring such hours. The previous analysis in fact includes individuals who
never perform overtime hours, or who no longer do so after the reform for various reasons. It
is also enlightening to look at the di⁄erence between the duration declared to the authorities
(equal to the sum of the legal duration plus the overtime hours), and the duration worked,
represented by the Deviation variable. An increase in the Deviation variable corresponds to an
augmentation of overtime hours greater than the augmentation of hours really worked.19 In the
presence of tax optimization, this di⁄erence should grow.
The ￿rst lines of table 3 report the overtime hours, the hours worked, and the Deviation
variable for employees declaring paid overtime hours after 1 October 2007. These employees
declare more overtime hours after October 2007 than before. Their length of time worked is
also higher after October 2007. The gap between the duration declared to the authorities and
the duration worked, declared in the survey, widens signi￿cantly, on the order of 0.3 hours per
week.
The following lines of table 3 show that the widening of the gap between hours declared to
the authorities and duration worked is more marked for employees who declare more overtime
hours after 1 October 2007 than before that date.We see that their length of time worked does
increase starting in October 2007, but not as much as their number of overtime hours does. The
gap between the duration declared to the authorities and the duration worked widens by 0.7
hours per week. This widening looks quite substantial when it is compared to the average of
weekly overtime hours, equal to 0.4.
The following lines of table 3 indicate that there is no signi￿cant variation in the di⁄erence
between duration declared and duration worked for employees who do not declare any overtime
hours after 1 October 2007. The same is true of employees who do not declare any more overtime
19The Deviation variable, equal to the di⁄erence between the legal duration augmented by overtime hours
on one hand, and the duration of work declared to the survey (which we call duration worked) on the other,
is generally negative. An increase in the Deviation variable thus generally corresponds to a diminution of its
absolute value.
16hours from October 2007 on than they did before that date.
On the whole, table 3 shows that the widening of the gap between hours declared to the
authorities and hours worked was greater for persons who declared more overtime hours after
October 2007 than before.
Table 4 details the results presented in table 3 for di⁄erent categories of employees. The
third column of table 4 shows that the di⁄erence between hours declared to the authorities
and hours worked by managers, technicians, and intellectual and artistic professions who have
declared more overtime hours since 1 October 2007 has increased considerably from that date on.
Almost half the increase in their overtime hours declared is not matched by any increase in their
length of time worked! Table 4 shows, on the other hand, that there is no widening of the gap
between the duration declared to the authorities and the duration worked for laborers who have
declared more overtime hours starting in October 2007. We obtain the same result concerning
low-wage employees (less than 1.3 times the minimum wage), for whom the opportunities for
optimization are, in the same way as for laborers, probably limited.
Taken as a whole, these descriptive elements suggest that the detaxation of overtime hours
may have incentivized a signi￿cant degree of ￿scal optimization, notably on the part of quali￿ed
employees, whose duration of work is hard to check up on. In these circumstances, the theoretical
model developed in the previous section shows that the detaxation of overtime hours has an
ambiguous impact on the length of time worked. We shall now examine the impact of the
detaxation of overtime hours by comparing the behaviors of individuals a⁄ected by this reform
with that of individuals who are in comparable situations, but who have not been a⁄ected by
this reform.
5 The impact of the reform
To pinpoint the impact of the detaxation of overtime hours, we compare the evolution of the paid
overtime hours and the hours worked for two groups of individuals, one of which is a⁄ected by
the reform and the other not. Our ￿rst strategy for pinpointing the impact of the reform consists
of a comparison between transborder employees, those who reside in France but work abroad in
bordering regions, and employees who reside and work in France. We start by discussing this
strategy, and then go on to present the results.
In the next stage, we compare the evolution of the duration of work of independent workers
17who do not employ anyone and thus are not a⁄ected by detaxation, with that of employees who
work in very small ￿rms.
5.1 Transborder employees and employees working in France
5.1.1 Identifying the impact of detaxation
Unlike employees who live and work in France, transborder workers have not bene￿ted from the
detaxation of overtime hours.20 So the overtime hours and the hours worked of French employees
ought to rise relative to those of transborder workers, beginning in the fourth quarter of 2007,
if the reform really did have the e⁄ects anticipated, and if other events have not altered the
relative hours of the two groups of employees.
A range of events might a⁄ect the paid overtime hours and the hours worked of the two
groups, independently of the detaxation of overtime hours.
i) The transborder workers might di⁄er from those who work in France. These di⁄erences
might have to do not just with observable characteristics, like educational level, age, or family
situation,21 but also with non-observable ones like motivation to work or personal ambition. Such
di⁄erences can lead to di⁄erent reactions to the economic situation, and diverging evolutions in
the duration of work and overtime hours. The EnquŒte Emploi, which collects information on
every individual for six consecutive quarters, allows us to take into account the heterogeneity of
observable and non-observable characteristics, constant over time, among transborder workers
20The detaxation of overtime hours e⁄ectively concerns a portion of social security contributions, and income
tax. Employees working in a neighboring country pay their social security contributions there (European Com-
munity regulation no. 1408/71, dated 14 June 1971), and thus do not bene￿t from the reduction in social security
contributions on overtime hours, which represents over three quarters of the total amount of the exemption.
Hence the detaxation of overtime hours always entails a more signi￿cant reduction of compulsory withholdings
for employees working in France than for transborder workers. As for the income tax, it is paid in France if the
employee has the ￿scal status of travailleur frontalier (transborder worker), meaning he or she resides not far from
the border and returns home su¢ ciently often (with the exception of persons working in Luxembourg or in the
canton of Geneva). Transborder workers who do pay their income tax in France only received con￿rmation that
they could bene￿t from the detaxation of overtime hours at the end of 2009, because of a juridical indeterminacy
(no explicit mention of transborder workers in the law on the detaxation of overtime hours, the absence of any
directive de￿ning the duration of work, without which it was impossible to say when the hours worked by trans-
border workers became overtime hours), which was cleared up in a circular of January 2010 (Bulletin o¢ ciel des
Imp￿ts no. 7, 14 January 2010). This circular states that the bene￿t of the detaxation applies to transborder
workers beginning on 1 October 2007. The overtime hours eligible for exemption from income tax are hours of
work performed beyond the legal duration of work set by the legislation on the duration of work in the country
where the employee holds his or her job, or, in the case of a country that does not ￿x any legal length of time
worked, beyond the duration provided for by a convention or a professional or interprofessional agreement. That
said, if the convention or professional or interprofessional agreement sets a duration of work below 35 hours, only
the hours e⁄ected past the 35-hour threshold are exempt.
21These characteristics are presented in table 14.
18and workers in France, by estimating the impact of the reform with regresssions that include
￿xed individual e⁄ects.
ii) The economic situation might be di⁄erent in France and in neighboring countries. To take
this phenomenon into account, we integrate variables measuring the situation in each country and
we compare the hours of transborder workers with those of employees working in departments
(administrative-territorial units) of France adjacent to the French border, in order to compare
employees working in homogeneous geographic zones.
iii) Fiscal reforms might in￿ uence the overtime hours and the hours worked in the bordering
countries. Such reforms might have an impact on the length of time worked of persons residing
in France who work abroad. This might be the case when social security contributions, system-
atically paid in the country where the job is held, are modi￿ed. This might also be the case for
persons working in Luxembourg or in the canton of Geneva, for in these cases taxes are paid in
the country where the job is held. We have veri￿ed that no reform introduced in a neighboring
country has led to a reduction in obligatory withholdings on hours of work in excess of the legal
or conventional duration of work as signi￿cant as in France.
iv) The composition of the two groups of workers might evolve over time, especially in a
period of recession. The EnquŒte Emploi allows us to resolve this problem, since it collects
information on every individual during six consecutive quarters. It is therefore possible to
compare the evolution of the duration of work and overtime hours for the same ensemble of
workers before and after the reform, thus neutralizing any bias due to an eventual alteration of
the composition of the groups. In order to ensure that variations in the length of time worked
and overtime hours do not arise from job changes, we limit ourselves to a sample of individuals
who kept the same job.22
The evaluation of the impact of the detaxation of overtime hours is realized through estim-
ating the equation
Yict = b0 + b1(Dt ￿ Fi) + b2Dt + b3Xct + ￿i + "it (1)
where Yict designates the duration of work or the paid overtime hours of individual i employed
in country c on date t. Dt is an dummy variable equal to zero before 1 October 2007 and to one
subsequently. Fi is an dummy variable equal to one for wage-earners employed in France and
22This choice also excludes indivudals who change jobs across countries, which could potentially impact the
evaluation of the reform. However, in our sample only 6 individuals changed the country where they work over
the corresponding period.
19to zero for transborder workers. Xct is a variable representing the quarterly economic situation,
measured, according to the speci￿cations, by the business climate or by the share of exports of
goods and services in the GDP of country c at date t (quarterly indicators of the OECD). ￿i is
a ￿xed individual e⁄ect and "it is a random factor of null average.
The coe¢ cient b1 measures the di⁄erence in variation after-before October 2007 between
the hours of work (or the overtime hours) of wage-earners employed in France and transborder
workers. In the context presented above, the coe¢ cient b1 measures the impact of the detaxation
of overtime hours on the duration of work or on overtime hours.
5.1.2 Results
Figure 2 shows that the di⁄erence between the hours of weekly work of wage-earners working
in France and transborder workers presents no tendency either upward or downward. This
￿gure also shows that the hours worked of employees working in France seem not to have
increased, relative to those of transborder workers, beginning in October 2007. This observation
is con￿rmed by table 5, which presents the variation, between before and after 1 October 2007,
in the di⁄erence between the duration of work and the overtime hours of employees working in
France and the same di⁄erence in the case of transborder workers (coe¢ cient b1 of equation (1)).
Table 5 distinguishes two regions in order to assure the greatest possible homogeneity of economic
situations, compatible with the availability of data.23 The "North" region is composed of the
border zones of Belgium, Luxembourg, and Germany. The "North-East" region is composed
of Luxembourg, Germany, and Switzerland. The ￿rst two columns are dedicated to the North
region, and the four following ones to the North-East region. The ￿rst column presents the
results for the North region without taking into account di⁄erences of economic situation between
regions. The second column takes into account di⁄erences in economic situation represented by
the share of exports in the GDP of each bordering country. Columns (3) and (4) present the
results of similar estimations for the North-East region, as well as columns (5) and (6) for both
regions taken together.24 We see that controlling for the economic situation yields no signi￿cant
change to any result in all that follows, which suggests that the geographic zone concerned is
23For this reason, we have eliminated Italy and Spain, which comprise an insu¢ cient number of observations.
24These results, as well as the following, remain qualitatively the same when we exclude individuals who have






















































































































































































































Figure 2: Di⁄erence centered on 0 between the weekly work duration of employees working in
France and transborder employees. Source: EnquŒte Emploi.
subject to the same economic situation.25
As a whole, table 5 shows that there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the evolution of the
durations of work of employees working in France and trans-border employees. Conversely, the
number of overtime hours declared by the employees residing in France increases, relative to
that of transborder employees, for certain speci￿cations. In particular, overtime hours increase
signi￿cantly for the most pertinent speci￿cations, which take account of the economic situation
and which concern wage-earners who keep the same job before and after October 2007. These
results are coherent with those of the previous section: after 1 October 2007, overtime hours
have a tendency to increase, but the length of time worked remains unchanged.
In order to better discern the extent of the results obtained in table 5, table 6 presents the
results of speci￿cations identical to those of table 5, but bearing on wage-earners whose duration
of work is a priori di¢ cult to verify. We have selected employees in teaching and the scienti￿c
professions, media professions, arts and entertainment, administrative and commercial managers
of ￿rms, engineers and technical personnel of ￿rms. On the whole, table 6 indicates that the
detaxation of overtime hours has led to growth in the overtime hours of categories of employees
whose duration of work is hard to verify, without having had any impact on their hours worked.
25We have also taken the economic situation into account with annual dummies or with the business climate
(trimestrial OECD indicator), without the results being a⁄ected.
21The number of overtime hours increases more for these employees, around 0.8 to 0.9 hours
as opposed to 0.5 to 0.6 for the group as a whole. In addition, it is striking to note that for
this category of employees, the paid overtime hours of those working in France grew relative
to those of the transborder employees, whereas their hours worked did not increase in absolute
terms relative to those of the transborder employees. The signs of the coe¢ cients associated to
the hours worked of the employees in France are in fact all negative, although not signi￿cant.
The contrast between the behavior of employees whose hours are hard to verify and that of
those whose hours are easier to verify emerges more convincingly in examining table 7. This table
presents the results of estimations identical to those of the two previous tables, but focusing this
time on laborers and wage-earning tradesmen. We see that the overtime hours, like the duration
of work, do not increase for the employees in this category working in France relative to those of
the transborder employees after October 2007. Here too, these results are coherent with those
of the previous section.26
In sum, comparison of the evolution of the length of time worked of wage-earners employed
in France and that of transborder workers indicates that the detaxation of overtime hours has
had no signi￿cant e⁄ect on length of time worked. This result holds good for all categories of
employee, whatever their socio-professional category or their wage level. Conversely, detaxation
of overtime hours has increased the number of overtime hours declared by relatively quali￿ed
employees, whose duration of work is particularly hard to verify.
5.2 Employees of very small ￿rms and independent workers
5.2.1 An alternative strategy of identi￿cation
In order to ensure the robustness of the foregoing results concerning the impact of detaxation on
length of time worked, we apply the same method as before, but we now select a di⁄erent group
of individuals who have not been directly a⁄ected by the reform. The detaxation of overtime
hours does a⁄ect all wage-earners. Independent workers who do not employ a wage-earner are,
however, not a⁄ected by detaxation. If the detaxation of overtime hours has really had an
impact on the duration of work of employees, we ought to observe a rupture in the di⁄erence of
duration of work of employees and independents starting in October 2007.
26Because of the large number of missing observations in the wage declarations, we are unable to conduct these
estimations on the reduced sample of transborder workers for wages below 1.3 SMIC, on one hand, and above
this marker on the other, as we did in the previous section.
22Comparison of the evolution of the duration of work27 between these two groups does not
necessarily make it possible to identify a causal impact of detaxation on the duration of work.
Several di⁄erent factors might a⁄ect the hours worked of these two groups, independently of the
detaxation of overtime hours.
1) For one thing, the independents might have individual characteristics and speci￿c working
conditions that cause them to react di⁄erently to the economic situation than employees do. In
order to limit these di⁄erences, we compare independents not employing a wage-earner with
wage-earners in ￿rms having just one employee.28 Moreover, we study separately two families of
trades within which economic conditions are more homogeneous: ￿rst, independent tradesmen
and wage-earning laborers in the trades, and second, retailers and retail employees.29. We
thus verify that the length of time worked has not varied di⁄erently between employees and
independents within these two families since 2003. Finally, we continue to take account of the
heterogeneity of observable and non-observable characteristics, which do not change over time,
between independents and employees by including ￿xed individual e⁄ects.
ii) As in the case of the transborder workers, the composition of the two groups might evolve
over time. A reform occurring in 2008, which created the easily accessible and ￿scally advant-
ageous status of auto-entrepreneur (self-entrepreneur) might have facilitated the transition from
the status of wage-earner to that of independent. To take account of these changes, we con￿ne
ourselves to individuals who change neither their status nor their job during the period, while
following the same ensemble of workers before and after the reform.
iii) Other reforms might have in￿ uenced the durations of work of the two groups independ-
ently. We have identi￿ed none of su¢ cient importance for the period preceding and following
the reform of 2007, the ￿scal regime having been globally stable over the whole of the period.
iv) Finally, by reducing the labor cost of wage-earners, the detaxation of overtime hours
might give them an advantage over independents. In consequence, the detaxation of overtime
hours might reduce the duration of work of the independents, who might lose market share to
wage-earners. This e⁄ect can only be slight, inasmuch as the detaxation of overtime hours has
only a slight e⁄ect on the cost of labor. Still, this does create a risk of over-estimating the
27Overtime hours evidently cannot be compared between these two groups, since the independents do not
declare any.
28Some characteristics of these independents and employees are presented in tables 15 to 17.
29We compare the evolution of the duration of work in occupations for whom the data are su¢ ciently abundant.
Other occupations, like the liberal professions or the health professions, cannot be studied because of the lack of





















































































































































































































Figure 3: Di⁄erence centered on 0 between the weekly work duration of employees and inde-
pendent workers. Laborers employed in the trades working in ￿rms with a single employee, and
independent tradesmen with no employees. Source: EnquŒte Emploi.
impact of detaxation on the length of time worked.
The impact of the reform is evaluated by estimating an equation similar to equation (1) for
hours worked.
5.2.2 Results
Figure 3 shows that the di⁄erence between the duration of work of independent trademen without
employees, and laborers in the trades who work in ￿rms with a single employee, remains stable
over the whole of the period. The graph reveals no increase in the relative duration of work of
the employees beginning in the fourth quarter of 2007. The same holds good for independent
retailers without employees, and retail employees who are the sole employee in their ￿rm (Figure
4).
Table 8 con￿rms these results. It presents the value of coe¢ cient b1 of equation (1) and its
standard deviation for di⁄erent families of employees. The ￿rst column concerns the ensemble
of employees in very small ￿rms, and independents not employing a wage-earner. For these two
groups, there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the evolution of the duration of work before and after




















































































































































































































Figure 4: Di⁄erence centered on 0 between the weekly work duration of employees and inde-
pendent workers. Retail employees working in ￿rms with a single employee and independent
retailers with no employees. Source: EnquŒte Emploi.
sector and the retail sector. The second column concerns the trades sector. The third column
concerns retail. In these two sectors, there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence in the evolution of the
duration of work as between employees and independents.
Finally, these results con￿rm the absence of e⁄ect of the reform of October 2007 on the
duration of work obtained previously by comparing employees working in France and those
working abroad. The detaxation of overtime hours has had no detectable impact on the length
of time worked.
6 Conclusion
The detaxation of overtime hours introduced in October 2007 was intended to allow individuals
in France to work more so as to earn more. The evaluation conducted in this article indicates
that the detaxation of overtime hours has not, in fact, had any signi￿cant impact on hours
worked. Conversely, it has indeed had a positive impact on paid overtime hours which create
an entitlement to tax reductions. Thus, the detaxation of overtime hours appears not to have
fully met its aim: while the wage-earners concerned have indeed bene￿ted from a spike in their
remuneration thanks to detaxation, that has not, on average, come about through working more.
25Detaxation is a measure costly for the public purse, without any ascertained impact on hours
worked.
This evaluation has focused on the impact of the measure on hours. Other dimensions could
be explored, for example employment, or employee motivation. The fact that hours worked
do not increase after October 2007 suggests, however, that the measure must have had a very
limited e⁄ect on employment.
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27Before After After￿Before p-value N















Table 1: Weekly number of overtime hours and of hours worked by all full-time employees of the
non-agricultural for-pro￿t sector. Average value for individuals interrogated before and after
October 2007. (1) Before October 2007. (2) After October 2007. (3) Di⁄erence. (4) p-value.
Null hypothesis: after-before di⁄erence equal to zero. (5) Number of observations. Standard
deviation in parentheses.
28Before After After￿Before p-value N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)




























































Table 2: Weekly number of overtime hours and of hours worked by full-time employees of the
non-agricultural for-pro￿t sector. Average value for individuals interrogated before and after
October 2007. (1) Before October 2007. (2) After October 2007. (3) Di⁄erence. (4) p-value.
Null hypothesis: after-before di⁄erence equal to zero. (5) Number of observations. Standard
deviation in parentheses.
29Before After After￿Before p-value N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
























































































Table 3: Weekly number of overtime hours and of hours worked by full-time employees of the
non-agricultural for-pro￿t sector. Average value for individuals interrogated before and after
October 2007. (1) Before October 2007. (2) After October 2007. (3) Di⁄erence. (4) p-value.
Null hypothesis: after-before di⁄erence equal to zero. (5) Number of observations. The variable
Deviation is the di⁄erence between the duration declared to the authorities (equal to the sum
of the legal duration plus the overtime hours), and the duration worked. Standard deviation in
parentheses.
30Before After After￿Before p-value N
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)


































































Table 4: Weekly number of overtime hours and of hours worked by full-time employees of the
non-agricultural for-pro￿t sector. Average value for individuals interrogated before and after
October 2007 who have declared overtime hours after October 2007. (1) Before October 2007.
(2) After October 2007. (3) Di⁄erence. (4) p-value. Null hypothesis: after-before di⁄erence
equal to zero. (5) Number of observations. The variable Deviation is the di⁄erence between the
duration declared to the authorities (equal to the sum of the legal duration plus the overtime
hours), and the duration worked. Standard deviation in parentheses.

























Economic situation No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 3 698 3 698 3 101 3 101 4 881 4 881
incl. treatment 3 191 3 191 2460 2460 4 146 4 146
incl. control 507 507 641 641 735 735
Table 5: Impact of the detaxation of overtime hours. Control group of transborder employ-
ees. (1) For employees of the North (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany) without taking into
account di⁄erences of economic situations. (2) For employees of the North (Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, Germany) taking into account di⁄erences of economic situations. (3) For employees of
the North-East (Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland) without taking into account di⁄erences
of economic situations. (4) For employees of the North-East (Luxembourg, Germany, Switzer-
land) taking into account di⁄erences of economic situations. (5) For employees of the North
and North-East (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland) without taking into account
di⁄erences of economic situations. (6) For employees of the North and North-East (Belgium,
Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland) taking into account di⁄erences of economic situations. Re-
gressions with individual ￿xed e⁄ects. Economic situation: share of exports in GDP. Robust
standard deviations in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10 percent, ** signi￿cant at 5 percent, ***
signi￿cant at 1 percent.

























Economic situation No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 1 128 1 128 903 903 1 474 1 474
incl. treatment 994 994 674 674 1 233 1 233
incl. control 134 134 229 229 241 241
Table 6: Impact of the detaxation of overtime hours for employees in teaching and the scienti￿c
professions, media professions, arts and entertainment, administrative and commercial managers
of ￿rms, engineers and technical personnel of ￿rms. Control group of transborder employees in
similar positions. (1) For employees of the North (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany) without
taking into account di⁄erences of economic situations. (2) For employees of the North (Belgium,
Luxembourg, Germany) taking into account di⁄erences of economic situations. (3) For employees
of the North-East (Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland) without taking into account di⁄erences
of economic situations. (4) For employees of the North-Eas (Luxembourg, Germany, Switzer-
land) taking into account di⁄erences of economic situations. (5) For employees of the North
and North-East (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland) without taking into account
di⁄erences of economic situations. (6) For employees of the North and North-East (Belgium,
Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland) taking into account di⁄erences of economic situations. Re-
gressions with individual ￿xed e⁄ects. Economic situation: share of exports in GDP. Robust
standard deviations in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10 percent, ** signi￿cant at 5 percent, ***
signi￿cant at 1 percent.

























Economic situation No Yes No Yes No Yes
Number of observations 1 636 1 636 1 437 1 437 2 177 2 177
incl. treatment 1 334 1 334 1 113 1 113 1 781 1 781
incl. control 302 302 324 324 396 396
Table 7: Impact of the detaxation of overtime hours for laborers and wage-earning tradesmen.
Control group of transborder employees in similar positions. (1) For employees of the North
(Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany) without taking into account di⁄erences of economic situ-
ations. (2) For employees of the North (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany) taking into account
di⁄erences of economic situations. (3) For employees of the North-East (Luxembourg, Germany,
Switzerland) without taking into account di⁄erences of economic situations. (4) For employees of
the North-Eas (Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland) taking into account di⁄erences of economic
situations. (5) For employees of the North and North-East (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany,
Switzerland) without taking into account di⁄erences of economic situations. (6) For employees
of the North and North-East (Belgium, Luxembourg, Germany, Switzerland) taking into ac-
count di⁄erences of economic situations. Regressions with individual ￿xed e⁄ects. Economic
situation: share of exports in GDP. Robust standard deviations in parentheses. * signi￿cant at








Number of observations 1 607 977 630
incl. employees 351 288 63
incl. independent 1256 689 567
Table 8: Impact of the detaxation of overtime hours on hours worked. Control group of in-
dependents. (1) For all employees (trades and retail sectors). (2) For employess in the trades
sector. (3) For employess in the retail sector. Regressions with individual ￿xed e⁄ects. Robust
standard deviations in parentheses. * signi￿cant at 10 percent, ** signi￿cant at 5 percent, ***
signi￿cant at 1 percent.
35APPENDIX
A Questions relating to the duration of work in the EnquŒte
Emploi
Persons interrogated in the EnquŒte Emploi who have worked during the reference week must describe
their professional activity. After questions about holidays that may have been taken during this period,
the following questions relating to the duration of work are asked:
Question B46 a. (variable EMPHSC)
"Have you e⁄ected overtime (or complementary) hours, paid or not?"
Question B46 b. (variable EMPHNH)
"How many overtime (or complementary) hours?"
Question B46 c. (variable EMPHRE)
"Of these overtime (or complementary) hours, how many are or will be remunerated?"
Question B46 d. (if the overtime hours were not all remunerated) (variable EMPHRC)
"And how many have created or will create an entitlement to compensatory rest?"
Question B47 a. (variable EMPAFF)
"Was your schedule a⁄ected by the following causes? (several possible answers)"
1. Partial unemployment, bad weather (Or: bad weather)
2. Time spent on training
3. Strike, labor con￿ ict
4. No, by none of the above factors
Question B47 b. (variable EMPAFC)
"How many hours or days of partial unemployment or bad weather?"
Question B47 c. (variable EMPAFA)
"How many hours or days of training?"
Question B47 d. (variable EMPAFG)
"How many hours or days of strike or labor con￿ ict?"
Question B48 a. (variable EMPNBH)
"During the week Monday to Sunday (dates), how many hours did you put in at your principal job?
(Not counting ordinary hours or days o⁄, or exceptional ones, or legal holidays, bridgesl, make-up time,
personal unpaid time o⁄, partial unemployment, training, strike, labor con￿ ict)."
36B Statistics on hours worked and overtime hours
B.1 By gender

























Number of observations 235 593 144 707 134 133 34 367
Table 9: Average number of hours over the week according to net wage (1) Total hours e⁄ected by
the employees. (2) Paid overtime hours by employees. (3) Overtime hours creating entitlement
to compensatory rest by employees. (4) Total hours e⁄ected by independents. Non-agricultural
for-pro￿t sector, for persons working full time. Standard deviations in parentheses.
B.2 By age
(1) (2) (3) (4)








































Number of observations 235 591 144 705 134 131 34 367
Table 10: Average number of hours over the week according to net wage (1) Total hours ef-
fected by the employees. (2) Paid overtime hours by employees. (3) Overtime hours creating
entitlement to compensatory rest by employees. (4) Total hours e⁄ected by independents. Non-
agricultural for-pro￿t sector, for persons working full time. Standard deviations in parentheses.
37B.3 By socio-professional category









































Number of observations 235 558 144 698 134 131 34 367
Table 11: Average number of hours over the week according to net wage. Non-agricultural for-
pro￿t sector, for persons working full time. (1) Total hours e⁄ected by the employees. (2) Paid
overtime hours by employees. (3) Overtime hours creating entitlement to compensatory rest by
employees. (4) Total hours e⁄ected by independents. Standard deviations in parentheses.
B.4 By level of net wage
(1) (2) (3)


































































Number of observations 235 593 144 707 134 133
Table 12: Average number of hours over the week according to net wage. (1) Total hours
e⁄ected by the employees. (2) Paid overtime hours by employees. (3) Overtime hours creating
entitlement to compensatory rest by employees. Non-agricultural for-pro￿t sector, for persons
working full time. Standard deviations in parentheses. Individuals are queried on their wage
only twice over six quarters. This table is based on the assumption that the wage remains
constant between two interrogations.
38C Evolution of overtime hours creating entitlement to compens-
atory rest
Table 13 shows that the only signi￿cant change in the number of overtime hours creating entitlement to
compensatory rest from October 2007 on is observed for the ensemble of employees in the non-agricultural
for-pro￿t sector. Nonetheless, there is not signi￿cant change for employees who declare paid overtime
hours. This means that the increase in paid overtime hours observed beginning in October 2007 has not
been matched by a diminution in the number of overtime hours creating entitlement to compensatory rest.
We also observe an absence of signi￿cant change for overtime hours creating entitlement to compensatory
rest for laborers, engineers, managers, teachers, scientists, arts and entertainment professionals.
Before Afters After￿Before p-value N
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Employees declaring more overtime hours after 1 October 2007 than before that date
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Table 13: Number of paid overtime hours for full-time employees in the for-pro￿t non-agriculture
sector. Average value for individuals interrogated before and after October 2007. (1) Before
October 2007. (2) After October 2007. (3) Di⁄erence. (4) p-value. Null hypothesis: Before-
After di⁄erence equal to zero. (5) Number of observations. Standard deviations in parenthesis.
39D Statistics on transborder employees






















Number of observations 3;283 20;742
Table 14: Characteristics of transborder employees and employees working in France. Education:
number of years of education. Number of children: number of children below 18 year-old in the
household. Weekly number of overtime hours and hours worked. Non-agricultural for-pro￿t
sector, for persons working full time. Standard errors in parentheses.



















Number of observations 4;786 3;859
Table 15: Characteristics of independents and employees in craft industry and retail. Education:
number of years of education. Number of children: number of children below 18 year-old in the
household. Weekly number of hours worked. Non-agricultural for-pro￿t sector, for persons



















Number of observations 1;109 1;730
Table 16: Characteristics of independents and employees in craft industry. Education: number of
years of education. Number of children: number of children below 18 year-old in the household.
Weekly number of hours worked. Non-agricultural for-pro￿t sector, for persons working full



















Number of observations 326 1;493
Table 17: Characteristics of independents and employees in the retail sector. Education: number
of years of education. Number of children: number of children below 18 year-old in the household.
Weekly number of hours worked. Non-agricultural for-pro￿t sector, for persons working full time.
Standard errors in parentheses.
41